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Security

CURRENT

  • TLS at the reverse proxy.
  • pvsk_ keys hashed SHA-256; raw secret shown once on create.
  • Prefix only in UI, admin, and Command.
  • Session CSRF on key mint/revoke.
  • 120 notes/minute/key; max 20 active keys per user.
  • API notes default unlisted (not on Browse/Trending).
  • Command stores bound keys as AES-256-GCM (cp_pastes_bindings.key_enc). Optional CP_PASTES_WRAP_KEY.
  • Admin 403 for non-staff; no password hashes, no full key material.
  • Anti-spam names on keys (2-48 chars, reject long random alnum).

PLANNED

  • RBAC: org admin, project operator, rater, read-only.
  • Organization and project isolation on every experiment query.
  • Audit log for promote, delete, key revoke, lens run.
  • Immutable scored versions.
  • Signed, short-TTL asset URLs.
  • Secret redaction before any RESEARCH training or LLM-as-judge (block API keys, JWTs, .env shapes).
  • Retention and deletion controls (legal hold vs purge).
  • Webhook HMAC, IP allowlists for enterprise.
  • Rate limits per org, not only per key.
  • Input sanitization on titles and tags (already on key names).

Rules that do not wait for Phase 8

Never store credentials inside paste content. Agents posting notes must not dump .env. If they do, treat as incident: revoke, redact, rotate.

Public CodeShare pastes are not a safe place for experiment payloads that include customer PII. Experiment writes should be unlisted or private and project-scoped.

Threat notes

  • Stolen pvsk_ writes unlisted notes as that user. Revoke is the control.
  • Stolen cpcl_ pings Command which holds the Pastes secret. Treat Command keys as production credentials.
  • LLM-as-judge can be prompt-injected by candidate text; sandbox the judge prompt and strip instructions from the artifact.